Rethinking The Hard Problem, Naturalism, and Idealism

Abstract

Contemporary discourse surrounding the hard problem of consciousness is generally considered a conflict between physicalism and dualism. In this paper, I argue for a third option which has largely been ignored by contemporary discourse by claiming that current conditions for a satisfactory answer to the hard problem are flawed. I identify two key informative conditions: the directionality and conceivability conditions. I then show how all current options fail to satisfy these conditions. I claim physicalism cannot satisfy the conceivability condition due to the Knowledge Argument. I consider three plausible objections to the knowledge argument: Lewis’ ability analysis, the old fact/new concept view, and Dennett’s dissolution of the problem. All of which I contend fail. Second, I claim that dualism will not work either, due to the reasons outlined in Karen Bennett’s paper “Why I am Not a Dualist” (Bennett 2021). Finally, I contend that the motivations for the directionality condition are dubious, and thus, we have reason to doubt it. Particularly, I argue that the directionality condition is motivated by a specific interpretation of the causal closure of physics that we need not accept. Since we have reason to doubt the directionality condition, a wide range of largely ignored solutions to the hard problem remain open to us. One of these options is idealism. Finally, I give a rough outline of an idealist theory and explain why it can solve a revised hard problem.